In strategic classification, the standard supervised learning setting is extended to support the notion of strategic user behavior in the form of costly feature manipulations made in response to a classifier. While standard learning supports a broad range of model classes, the study of strategic classification has, so far, been dedicated mostly to linear classifiers. This work aims to expand the horizon by exploring how strategic behavior manifests under non-linear classifiers and what this implies for learning. We take a bottom-up approach showing how non-linearity affects decision boundary points, classifier expressivity, and model class complexity. Our results show how, unlike the linear case, strategic behavior may either increase or decrease effective class complexity, and that the complexity decrease may be arbitrarily large. Another key finding is that universal approximators (e.g., neural nets) are no longer universal once the environment is strategic. We demonstrate empirically how this can create performance gaps even on an unrestricted model class.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst-and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

A major field at the intersection of economics and computer science is the analysis of the efficiency of systems under strategic behavior.

We introduce the Strategic Doubly Robust (SDR) estimator, a novel framework that integrates strategic equilibrium modeling with doubly robust estimation for causal inference in strategic environments. SDR addresses endogenous treatment assignment arising from strategic agent behavior, maintaining double robustness while incorporating strategic considerations. Theoretical analysis confirms SDR's consistency and asymptotic normality under strategic unconfoundedness. Empirical evaluations demonstrate SDR's superior performance over baseline methods, achieving 7.6\%-29.3\% bias reduction across varying strategic strengths and maintaining robust scalability with agent populations. The framework provides a principled approach for reliable causal inference when agents respond strategically to interventions.

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in socially complex, interaction-driven tasks, yet their ability to mirror human behavior in emotionally and strategically complex contexts remains underexplored. This study assesses the behavioral alignment of personality-prompted LLMs in adversarial dispute resolution by simulating multi-turn conflict dialogues that incorporate negotiation. Each LLM is guided by a matched Five-Factor personality profile to control for individual variation and enhance realism. We evaluate alignment across three dimensions: linguistic style, emotional expression (e.g., anger dynamics), and strategic behavior. GPT-4.1 achieves the closest alignment with humans in linguistic style and emotional dynamics, while Claude-3.7-Sonnet best reflects strategic behavior. Nonetheless, substantial alignment gaps persist. Our findings establish a benchmark for alignment between LLMs and humans in socially complex interactions, underscoring both the promise and the limitations of personality conditioning in dialogue modeling.